WASHINGTON - The president of the United States takes to the airwaves to urgently persuade the nation to pause before doing something it has no desire to do in the first place.
Strange. And it gets stranger still. That "strike Syria, maybe" speech begins with a heart-rending account of children consigned to a terrible death by a monster dropping poison gas.
It proceeds to explain why such behavior must be punished. It culminates with the argument that the proper response - the most effective way to uphold fundamental norms, indeed human decency - is a flea bite: something "limited," "targeted" or, as so memorably described by Secretary of State John Kerry, "unbelievably small."
The mind reels, but there's more. We must respond - but not yet. This "Munich moment" (Kerry again) demands first a pause to find accommodation with that very same toxin-wielding monster, by way of negotiations with his equally cynical, often shirtless, Kremlin patron bearing promises.
The promise is to rid Syria of its chemical weapons. The negotiations are open-ended. Not a word from President Obama about any deadline or ultimatum. And utter passivity: Kerry said hours earlier that he awaited the Russian proposal.
Why? The administration claims (preposterously, but no matter) that Obama has been working on this idea with Putin at previous meetings.
Take at face value Obama's claim of authorship. Then why isn't he taking ownership? Why isn't he calling it the "U.S. proposal" and defining it? Why not issue a U.S. plan containing the precise demands, detailed timeline and threat of action should these conditions fail to be met?
Putin doesn't care one way or the other about chemical weapons. Nor about dead Syrian children. Nor about international norms, parchment treaties and the other niceties of the liberal imagination.
He cares about power and he cares about keeping Bashar al-Assad in power. Assad is the key link in the anti-Western Shiite crescent stretching from Tehran through Damascus and Beirut to the Mediterranean - on which sits Tartus, Russia's only military base outside the former Soviet Union.
This axis frontally challenges the pro-American Sunni Arab Middle East (Jordan, Yemen, the Gulf Arabs, even the North African states), already terrified at the imminent emergence of a nuclear Iran.
At which point the Iran axis and its Russian patron would achieve dominance over the moderate Arab states, allowing Russia to supplant America as regional hegemon for the first time since Egypt switched to our side in the Cold War in 1972.